Torts—Sufficiency of Libel Complaint by Buffalo Law Review
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 9 Number 1 Article 119 
10-1-1959 
Torts—Sufficiency of Libel Complaint 
Buffalo Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Buffalo Law Review, Torts—Sufficiency of Libel Complaint, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 202 (1959). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol9/iss1/119 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
off."13 7 This is not to say that the acts complained of in the instant case should
be condoned. The question, rather, is the d propos remedy for protection.
Here, for example, Electrolux could have found another outlet for its trade-ins.
They could also have brought the situation to the attention of the Attorney
General for a possible application of Section 396 of the General Business Law.
An application to the Federal Trade Commission might have had a salutary
effect. Perhaps none of these would be effective, but nevertheless, as was said
by a leading scholar in this area,
The real need for careful thought arises when a court is asked to
enjoin a kind of trade injury, which although novel is bound to arise
again and again. Then, if the court goes ahead, it will be undertaking
the regulation of competition, and not just stopping objectionable
acts by this single defendant. The court will be beginning a perma-
nent job of business management . . . That is what will happen if
they consent to enjoin trade practices now unfamiliar to them like
false advertising or the piracy of dress designs. So, before the courts
start on such a big job, they want to be sure that it can be handled
well in private litigation. Moral indignation against the defendant
and his "dirty tricks" does not suffice to make the relief wise. 8s
Inasmuch as the instant decision has been handed down, what will be its
impact on future cases? It is submitted that it should receive the same treat-
ment accorded the case on which the Court so heavily relies, i.e. International
News Service.3 9 It should be limited in effect to substantially the same fact
situation, leaving to the legislature any further regulation of "unfair competi-
tion."
SUFFICIENCY OF LIBEL COMPLAINT
A recent case, Tracy v. Newsday, Inc.,40 presented the question of the
sufficiency of a libel complaint. The defendant had published in its newspaper
an article concerning the failure of an alleged sex offender, Jerome, to appear
in court for trial. The article relating the events in the case contained a refer-
ence to the effect that plaintiff, who was an investigator for Jerome's attorney,
had helped Jerome carry his bags from his hotel four days before the trial, and
also that plaintiff was the last person to hear from Jerome who had called him
three days before the trial to cancel an appointment to go with plaintiff to the
trial. By way of innuendo plaintiff claimed that the article identified him as
having helped Jerome jump bail and escape the consequences of his criminal
action, that the statements are false, and that as a result he had been held
up to public contempt, disgrace and ridicule and had been irreparably injured
in his calling as a police inspector and criminologist. The Supreme Court
37. Chafee, op. cit. supra note 1; Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and
Injuries to Personality, 29 Hamv. L. Rxv. 640 (1916); Nims, Unfair Competition by False
Statements or Disparagement, 19 ComerIx L.Q. 63 (1933); see also Chief Justice Hughes in
ALA. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States., 495, 531-2 (1935).
38. Chafee, op. cit. supra note 1.
39. Supra note 11.
40. 5 N.Y.2d 134, 182 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1959).
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dismissed the complaint; 41 the Appellate Division reversed; 42 and the Court of
Appeals in a four-three decision reversed the Appellate Division and held that
the complaint did not state a cause of action.
43
In order for a publication to be actionable without proof of special
damages it must be libelous per se, i.e. it must on its face subject the plaintiff
to public aversion, contempt, hatred or disgrace, cause the public to form
unsavory opinion of plaintiff, or damage him in his trade or business.44 In-
nuendo pleaded in a libel complaint is merely for the purpose of explaining the
defamatory meaning which the plaintiff would give to the publication; it
cannot expand, extend or change a publication so as to give it a defamatory
meaning.45 In this case the Court split on the question of whether the publica-
tion was capable of an actionable meaning. It has been generally held that it
is for the court and not the jury to decide whether an admittedly published
statement is capable of a defamatory meaning. 46 If the court decides that the
publication is capable of a defamatory meaning and a non-defamatory meaning,
it is then for the jury to decide which meaning the publication actually im-
parted and in addition whether the publication related to the plaintiff.47
The majority in the Tracy case held that the publication in question was
incapable of any defamatory meaning. The dissenting minority on the other
hand, felt that it might be construed as defamatory and for that reason the
issue should have been submitted to the jury. It has been said of the judicial
function in this area-"A court, it is fundamental, should never take from a
jury doubtful questions of fact, but it is equally basic that a court shirks its
duty if it creates an issue where none exists." 48 It does not seem that a pub-
lication such as this, which on its face tends to rebutt the libelous meaning
urged in the innuendo, can be said to be libelous per se. The majority opinion
reached a wise result holding it was not, and thereby, denying plaintiff recovery
unless he could prove special damages.
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE POLICE PROTECTION
On an appeal, testing the sufficiency of the complaint, a holding by the
41. - Misc.-, 160 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1957).
42. 5 A.D.2d 865, 171 N.Y.S. 2d 717 (1958).
43. Tracy v. Newsday, Inc., supra note 40.
44. Katopolis v. Brooklyn Spectator, Inc., 287 N.Y. 17, 38 N.E.2d 112 (1941);
Nichols v. Item Publishers, 309 N.Y. 596, 132 N.E.2d 860 (1956); Balabanoff v. Hearst
Consolidated Publications, Inc., 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d 599 (1945); Mencher v. Chesley,
297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947).
45. Fray v. Bennett, 5 Sandf. 65 (1851) aff'd 6 N.Y. 209 (1852); Fleishmann v. Ben-
nett, 87 N.Y. 231 (1881); O'Connell v. The Press Publishing Co., 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E.2d
556 (1915); Hayes v. American Defense Society, 252 N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929).
46. Moore v. Francis, 121 N.Y. 199, 23 N.E. 1127 (1890); O'Connell v. The Press
Publishing Co., supra note 45.
47. Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N.Y. 398 (1871); First National Bank v. Winters, 225
N.Y. 47, 121 N.E. 459 (1918); Julian v. American Business Consultants, 2 N.Y.2d 1, 155
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
48. Crane v. N.Y. World Telegram Corp., 308 N.Y. 470, 479-480, 126 N.E.2d 753,
759 (1955).
